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Abstract
As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insuﬃcient:
besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting
protocols have been proposed and implemented to provide such strengthened forms of authentication, but
there are very few proofs that such protocols satisfy the required security properties. In some cases, the
proofs can be provided in the symbolic model. More often, various physical factors invalidate the perfect
cryptography assumption, and the symbolic model does not apply. In such cases, the protocol cannot be
secure in an absolute logical sense, but only with a high probability. But while probabilistic reasoning
is thus necessary, the analysis in the full computational model may not be warranted, since the protocol
security does not depend on any computational assumptions, or on attacker’s computational power, but
only on some guessing chances.
We reﬁne the Dolev-Yao algebraic method for protocol analysis by a probabilistic model of guessing, needed
to analyze protocols that mix weak cryptography with physical properties of nonstandard communication
channels. Applying this model, we provide a precise security proof for a proximity authentication protocol,
due to Hancke and Kuhn, that uses probabilistic reasoning to achieve its goals.
Keywords: security protocol, pervasive authentication, symbolic model, Bayesian reasoning, distance
bounding
1 Introduction
Two paradigms of security. Traditionally, two paradigms have been used for
proving protocol security. The ﬁrst one, captured by the symbolic model, commonly
known as “Dolev-Yao”, describes both protocol and attacker in terms of an algebraic
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theory [14]. While this has been criticized as crude, it is often highly eﬀective and
easily automated. The other paradigm, captured by the computational model,
usually relies on some notion of indistinguishability from the point of view of a
computationally limited attacker [18]. Recently, a lot of research [3,32], starting
with [1], has been devoted to drawing the two paradigms closer together. This
strategy has generally been to rely upon crypto-algorithms that themselves satisfy
strong enough deﬁnitions of security, so that, if used in the proper way, they can be
treated as Dolev-Yao “black boxes”.
Problem of pervasive security. However, there is an emerging class of security
protocols for which it seems diﬃcult to bring these two paradigms together. Such
protocols arise in heterogenous networks of diverse computational and communica-
tion devices, with mixed type channels between them [34]. Nowadays ubiquitous,
such networks can be viewed as a realization of Doug Engelbart’s visionary idea of
smart space and pervasive computation [16]. The spatial aspects of computation
give rise to a new family of security problems, where the standard authentication
requirements need to be strengthened by proofs of spatial proximity. In some cases,
it has been possible to reﬁne symbolic methods to get stronger proofs [23,30]. But
there are other cases that resist symbolic analysis.One such case is the Hancke-
Kuhn distance bounding protocol [21], which we analyze in the present paper. The
protocol consists of a timed challenge-response exchange in which a prover Peggy
needs to convince a veriﬁer Victor that she is in the vicinity. Peggy’s rapid re-
sponse to Victor’s challenge is implemented using a rapidly computable function.
The requirement that the function must be rapidly computable turns out to weaken
it cryptographically. One of the main requirements of cryptographic strength is
diﬀusion: for a boolean function, each bit of the output should depend on each
bit of the input. But such a function is not rapidly computable. The other way
around, an on-line function, that produces its output while still receiving its in-
put, is easier to compute, but cannot be cryptographically strong. So there is a
tradeoﬀ between cryptographic strength and rapid computability. We explore this
tradeoﬀ in Sec. 5, and quantify the information leakage of on-line functions. The
Hancke-Kuhn protocol is based on such a function.
Already in the original presentation [21] of their protocol, Hancke and Kuhn
wrote down an estimate of the attacker’s chance to guess a response bit. However,
besides attempting to guess some bits of the response, the attacker may also attempt
to guess the secret on which the response is based. Moreover, he may attempt his
guesses directly, or make use of the responses stored from other sessions. Last but
not least, he may collude with Peggy. Towards a precise security proof, the diverse
strategies available to the attacker must be evaluated together, and exhaustively.
This requires a formal model of protocol execution.
Bayesian security. But what model to use? The symbolic model cannot be
used because the perfect cryptography assumption is not validated by the on-line
function, which is the central feature of the protocol. On the other hand, the
cryptographic strength and weakness of this function, and the resulting security and
insecurity of their protocol, does not have anything to do with any computational
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assumptions, or with the computational power of the adversary: it only depends on
guessing chances, which cannot be essentially increased by computational power.
Thus using the computational model does not contribute to the analysis of the
central feature of the protocol, although it does apply to any implementation.
The most natural model for analyzing the Hancke-Kuhn protocol that we came
up with extends the symbolic model by a rudimentary probabilistic theory of guess-
ing. It retains the perfect cryptography assumption for the standard cryptographic
primitives used in the protocol, in particular for the keyed hash function. In a
probabilistic context, though, the perfect cryptography assumption means that the
output distributions of the relevant cryptographic primitives are statistically indis-
tinguishable from the uniform distribution. Assuming this for the hash function
used in the protocol brings us close to the random oracle assumption, often used
in computational analyses [4]. There is a sense in which the random oracle as-
sumption can be construed as the probabilistic version of the perfect cryptography
assumption.
In summary, we contend that the simplest model capturing the central features
of the Hancke-Kuhn authentication protocol must be probabilistic, but need not
be computational. The probabilistic model that we propose is an extension of the
symbolic theories used in our previous work [22,8,24]. On the other hand, a ver-
sion of the standard computational model can be obtained as an extension of this
probabilistic model (by distinguishing a submonoid of feasible functions within our
monoid of randomized boolean functions). It should be noted that these logical
maps between the models go in the opposite direction from those in the explo-
rations of the computational soundness of the various fragments of the symbolic
model [1,3,32]. In such explorations, the symbolic languages are mapped (inter-
preted) in the computational language; here, a more concrete model is mapped
onto a more abstract model, which is its quotient, just like blocks of low-level code
are mapped onto the expressions of a high-level programming language, or like
more concrete state machines are mapped on more abstract state machines [25,26].
It follows that anything proven about the abstract model remains valid about its
more concrete implementations: e.g., the Bayesian reasoning about secrecy remains
valid in the computational model — provided that the assumed randomness of the
hash function can be validated. This proviso is, of course, not satisﬁed in practice,
since cryptographic hash functions are not truly random. The task, thus, remains
to strengthen or reﬁne the reasoning as to be able to discharge such unrealistic as-
sumptions. This logical strategy was discusssed in [22,8]. While not widely accepted
in security, this is a standard approach to reﬁnement based software development:
e.g., Euclid’s algorithm is usually described assuming the ring of integers; but the
assumption that there are inﬁnitely many integers must be discharged before the
algorithm is implemented in a real computer.
The space does not allow us to delve into the details of this approach, as applied
to security. They will be presented elsewhere. In the present paper, we attempt to
present a very special instance of this approach, where a modest probabilistic ex-
tension of the symbolic model suﬃces for the problem at hand — yet it leads to an
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essentially diﬀerent reasoning framework, with bayesian derivations instead of logi-
cal. The resulting technical divergence, mitigated by the conceptual guidance from
the underlying simpler model, should be viewed as one of the main features of the
incremental approach, pursued in the Protocol Derivation Logic (PDL) [22,8,24].
In [23], PDL was already used to analyze distance bounding protocols, similar to
Hancke-Kuhn’s, and for reasoning about pervasive security in general. An inter-
esting feature of the current probabilistic extension of PDL is that the concept of
guards, originally developed for reasoning about secrecy [24], now provides a crucial
stepping stone into our analysis of guessing chances, and of the concrete authenti-
cation guarantees in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol in Sec. 6, as well as in the abstract
view of symbolic authentication in Thm. 3.4.
Related work. As already mentioned, the closest relative of the PDL formalism,
underlying this work, and brieﬂy summarized in Sec. 3, is PCL [15,11,10]. Both for-
malisms owe a lot to strand spaces [17], in spirit, and in execution models, although
the logical methods diverge. Our probabilistic extension of PDL is predated by the
probabilistic extension of PCL in [12], and by the probabilistic extension of strand
spaces in [20]. But each of the three probabilistic approaches has a diﬀerent intent,
and a completely diﬀerent implementation, conceptually and technically. It would
be interesting to explore these diﬀerences more closely, as some tasks may yield to
combined modeling methods.
Paper outline. The paper continues with a review of distance bounding authenti-
cation, and a description of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. In Sec. 3 we provide a brief
overview of the derivational method of protocol analysis, and of PDL. We also re-
call the algebraic notions of derivability and guards, originally used for derivational
analyses of secrecy, and here adapted for authenticity. The probabilistic versions
of these notions are introduced in Sec. 4, and then used to model guessing. The
gathered tools are then put to use. In Sec. 5, we analyze the information leakage
of on-line functions in general, and characterize the Hancke-Kuhn function among
them. In Sec. 6, we quantify the authentication achieved in the Hancke-Kuhn pro-
tocol. Sec. 7 closes the paper with a summary of the results and a discussion of the
extensions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Hancke-Kuhn protocol
2.1 Background
In a man-in-the-middle attack on a challenge-response protocol, the attacker relays
messages, sometimes modiﬁed, between the legitimate participants. If resending a
message takes time, the legitimate participants may observe slower traﬃc. This has
been proposed as a method to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. In particular, the
challenger can measure the presumed round trip of his challenge and of responder’s
response, and compute a maximal distance of the responder, assuming an upper
bound on the message velocity. This can assure the authenticity of the response,
if it is known that the attacker cannot be too close. This is the idea of distance
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bounding [13,5]. The early security analyses of distance bounding protocols go back
to the early 1990s [6]. The interest in this type of authentication re-emerged recently,
with the task of device pairing and a genuine need for proximity authentication in
pervasive networks. From the outset, the basic idea of distance bounding was to
combine some cryptographic authentication tools, such as hashes or signatures, with
a physical constraint, such as the limited speed of message exchange. Most distance
bounding protocols [6,7,23] implement this combination by using two channel types:
the standard network channels for the cryptographic authentication, and the timed
channels for the rapid response. The Hancke-Kuhn protocol [21] stands out by it
simplicity, and by the fact that both cryptographic data and the rapid response
are sent on the timed channel. This, however, comes for the price of information
leakage, which makes the security analysis interesting.
2.2 The protocol
As mentioned before, the goal of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol is that the prover Peggy
proves to the veriﬁer Victor that she is nearby. It is assumed that Peggy and Victor
share a long term secret s, and a public hash function H. The relevant security
requirement from H will turn out to be a version of the range preimage resistance
[29]. The simplest way to present a protocol session is to view it in two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, Peggy and Victor exchange values a and b, which can be
predictable for the attacker, but must never be reused by Peggy and Victor in more
than one protocol session. The values a and b can thus be viewed as counters.
V P
νx
τ〈x〉
τ(xh)
(x)
〈xh〉
Fig. 1. Hancke-Kuhn protocol: Second Stage
In the second stage, Peggy and Victor both form the hash h = H(s :: a :: b)
and proceed with the exchange on Fig. 1. If Victor’s challenge x = (xi) ∈ Z

2
is a bitstring of length , then the hash h should be 2 bits long which we view
as a concatenation h = h(0) :: h(1) ∈ Z22 of two strings of  bits. The function
 : Z2 × Z
2
2 −→ Z

2 is deﬁned bitwise for i = 1, 2, . . . ,  by
(x h)i = h
(xi)
i (1)
To summarize Fig. 1,
• Victor generates a random bitstring x of length , and sends each bit xi of x at
times τ i.
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• To each bit xi, Peggy responds with h
(0)
i if xi = 0, and with h
(1)
i if xi = 1.
• Victor receives Peggy’s i-th bit response at time τ i. He knows h as well, and
can check that these responses are correct. If only he and Peggy know h, then
the responder must be Peggy. He then uses the times between the sending the
challenges and receiving the responses, together with the velocity of the message
signal, to compute his distance from Peggy.
2.3 Discussion
Leaking information to the attacker. The crucial component of the protocol
is the Hancke-Kuhn function . Its main feature is that it is rapidly computable,
as eﬃciently as the exclusive or ⊕. It is thus as suitable for timed authentication
as ⊕, but it also leaks information, although less than ⊕: while x and x ⊕ g allow
extracting g because g = x ⊕ x ⊕ g, x and x  h allow extracting only half of the
bits of h. However, it is easy to see from (1) that from x, and x h, and moreover
(¬x) h, the attacker can extract all of h. That is why Peggy and Victor must not
reuse their counters. If h = H(s :: a :: b) can be used in two responses, then an
attacker can challenge Peggy twice, ﬁrst with x and then with ¬x, and thus get xh
and (¬x)  h as the two responses. From this, he can extract h and impersonate
Peggy to Victor. Even if the counters are never reused, the fact that half of the
response bits can be acquired by an attacker needs to be carefully examined, and
his chances to guess the rest evaluated.
Overlooked assumption. Hancke and Kuhn’s estimate that the probability that
an attacker may succeed in impersonating Peggy is (34)
|x| relies on the implicit
assumption that |x| ≤ |s|. Otherwise, if |x| > |s|, the attacker has better odds to
guess s than x. In practice, of course, the assumption |x| ≤ |s| is usually satisﬁed,
because the secret s is usually at least 256 bits long, while the challenge x may
be shorter. Strictly speaking, though, the impression that protocol’s security only
depends on the length of the challenge x is not correct, since a short secret s would
make it vulnerable.
Dishonest prover and the kernel. Another interesting weakness is that the
value of Peggy’s i-th response bit (x  h)i does not depend on xi if h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i . A
dishonest Peggy can thus analyze the hash h and respond without waiting for xi
whenever h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i . If the response time is averaged, she is likely to appear closer
to Victor than she really is.
Since Victor’s counter b is predictable, Peggy can attempt to choose her own
counter a to maximize the size of the kernel κh of h = H(s :: a :: b), deﬁned
κh= {i ≤  | h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i } (2)
The larger the kernel, the closer Peggy can appear to Victor. However, the problem
of ﬁnding a value a such that, for a ﬁxed s and b, the image H(s :: a :: b) has a
desired property is a version of the range preimage problem [29]. The assumption
that H is a hash function, and in particular that it is a one-way function, implies
that dishonest Peggy’s advantage in ﬁnding a preimage a such that H(s :: a :: b),
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given s and b, falls within a desired range of strings with a large kernel, is negligible.
This means that dishonest prover’s manipulation of the kernel is unfeasible.
Further ad hoc observations get more complicated, without providing any deﬁ-
nite assurances. This demonstrates the need for a rigorous analysis within a formal
model.
Modeling the essence of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. The assumption that
H is a one-way function will turn out to be the only point where the security of
the Hancke-Kuhn protocol depends on computation. All other attack strategies
only involve guessing chances. To show this, in the following sections we introduce
a probabilistic (Bayesian) protocol model, which strictly extends the standard al-
gebraic (symbolic) model, and is a strict fragment of the standard computational
model. The hash H is modeled as a randomized function, as deﬁned in Sec. 4.
The perfect cryptography assumption of the symbolic model lifts in our Bayesian
model to the assumption that the hashes are truly random, which is, of course,
analogous to the random oracle assumption in the computational model. It allows
us to abstract away the generic and negligible vulnerabilities, and to focus on the
interesting aspects of the security of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol, achieved in spite
of the cryptographic weakness of the  function as it central feature.
3 Algebraic protocol models
We analyze the Hancke-Kuhn protocol by the derivational method. The varied ver-
sions of this method have been applied to many protocols [15,22,8,11,10]. While the
algebraic protocol model suﬃces in most cases, the Hancke-Kuhn protocol requires
an evaluation of guessing chances. We attempt to ﬁnd a simple model that will
allow this.
3.1 Message algebras
In the Dolev-Yao protocol model, messages are represented as terms of a free algebra
of encryption and decryption operations [14]. More general algebraic models allow
additional operations, and additional equations [9]. Recall that an algebraic theory
is a pair (O,E), where O is a set of ﬁnitary operations (given as symbols with
arities), and E a set of well-formed equations (i.e. where each operation has a
correct number of arguments) [19].
Deﬁnition 3.1 An algebraic theory T = (O,E) is called a message theory if O
includes a binary pairing (−,−) operation, and the unary operations π1 and π2 such
that E contains the equations π1(u, v) = u, π2(u, v) = v, and ((x, y) , z) = (x, (y, z)).
A message algebra is a polynomial extension T [X ] of a T-algebra T .
Remarks. The third equation implies that there is a unique n-tupling operation
for every n. The ﬁrst two imply that the components of any tuple can be recovered.
A polynomial extension T [X ] is the free T-algebra generated by adjoining a set of
indeterminates X to a T-algebra T [19, §8]. The elements x, y, z . . . of X are used to
represent nonces and other randomly generated values. This is justiﬁed by the fact
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that indeterminates can be consistently renamed: nothing changes if we permute
them. That is just the property required from the random values generated in a
run of a protocol 4 .
3.2 Protocol models
There are several protocol modeling formalisms that can be used for protocol deriva-
tions. The process calculus in [15,11] was designed speciﬁcally for this purpose.
Strand spaces [17] were designed for a diﬀerent purpose, but they can be adapted for
protocol derivations too. In [22,8,24] we used partially ordered multisets (pomsets)
of actions [27], which allow simple tool support [2]. We stick with this approach,
but the subtle (or in some cases not so subtle) diﬀerences between these approaches
are of no consequence here. For completeness, we provide a brief overview. For
more detail, the reader may want to consult some of the mentioned references.
In all cases, the set of actions A is generated over the message algebra T [X ] by a
grammar allowing each term t ∈ T [X ] to be sent in the action 〈t〉 ∈ A, and received
in the action (t) ∈ A. Moreover, an indeterminate x ∈ X can be introduced into a
protocol by the binding action (νx) ∈ A, which is read as ”generate fresh x”.
Challenge-response
V P
νx
〈cV P x〉
(rV P x)
((cV P x))
〈〈rV P x〉〉
Fig. 2. CR template
Fig. 2 shows the abstract challenge-response protocol template, where the veriﬁer
V ictor authenticates the prover P eggy. It is assumed that only Peggy is able to
transform the fresh challenge cV Px into the response rV Px. This assumption is
construed as a constraint on the operations cV P and rV P . The actions 〈〈t〉〉, and
((t)) are syntactic sugar for “send (resp. receive) a message from which anyone can
extract t”.
3.3 Views, derivability and guards
As usual, the communication channels are assumed to be controlled by the attacker:
she observes all sent messages, and controls their delivery. However, she may not
4 Of course, this is not the only requirement imposed on nonces and random values. The other requirement
is that they are known only locally, i.e. by those principals who generate them, or who receive them
unencrypted. This requirement is not formalized within the algebra of messages, but by the binding rules
of process calculus or actions by which the messages are sent [11,24].
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be able to invert all operations, and she has no insight into the fresh or secret data
of other principals. Hence the diﬀerent views of the various protocol participants.
A state σ reached in a protocol execution is a lower closed pomset of actions
executed up to that point, with an assignment of values to principals’ local variables,
which they use to store messages and their local computations. The view ΓσP of a
principal P at a state σ consists of all terms that P may have observed up to σ,
and all terms that she could derive from that. Formally, this last clause means that
ΓσP is upper closed under the derivability relation
Ξ  Θ ⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ Θ ∃ϕ ∈ O(n) ∃s1, . . . , sn ∈ Ξ. t
E
= ϕ(s1, . . . , sn) (3)
where Ξ,Θ ⊆ T [X ] are ﬁnite sets of terms, O(n) is the set of well-formed n-ary
operations in the signature O, and the equation is derivable from E.
Authentication by challenge-response
The challenge-response protocol in Fig. 2 validates authentication if Victor is justi-
ﬁed in drawing a global conclusion from his local observation: i.e., having observed
his own actions in on the left, Victor should have good reasons to conclude that
Peggy must have performed her actions on the right, and that all these actions
should be ordered as on the ﬁgure. Intuitively, this conclusion of Victor’s can be
justiﬁed by the assumptions that
(i) anyone who originated the response rV Px had to previously receive the chal-
lenge cV Px, which could only happen after Victor sent this challenge;
(ii) no one could produce rV Px without knowing the secret sV P , so it must be
Peggy.
This last conclusion is based on the assumption that only Peggy knows sV P , or only
Peggy and Victor. In both cases, Victor’s reasoning is the same, because he knows
that he did not send rV Px.
Using the derivability relation, these informal justiﬁcations can be reﬁned into
slightly more formal proof obligations in terms of (3), as follows. For any set of
principals Π, it is required that
(i) whenever there is a derivation Ξ  rV Px, then there must also be a derivation
Ξ  cV Px, for any set of terms Ξ observed by Π in a run of CR before rV Px is
sent;
(ii) whenever there is a derivation Ξ, cV Px  rV Px, then there must also be a
derivation Ξ, cV Px  sV P , for any set of terms Ξ known to Π in a run of CR
before rV Px is sent.
This type of authentication reasoning can be formalized using the notion of
guards from [24].
Deﬁnition 3.2 We say that a set of sets of terms G algebraically guards a term
t with respect to a set of terms Υ, and write G guards t within Υ if for all Ξ ⊆ Υholds
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Ξ  t⇒∃Γ ∈ G. Ξ  Γ (4)
Explanation. We say that, in a context C, G guards t if every computation path
to t leads through some element of G. In other words, if Ξ allows computing t, then
it is ”because” it allows computing some of t’s guards from G.
Example. Let Υ = (DH) be the set of terms that may become known to the
participants and eavesdroppers of a run of the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol. Then{
{x, gy}, {y, gx}
}
guards gxy within (DH)
Note that gxy can be derived not only from {x, gy} and {y, gx} but also from {g, x, y}
and {g, xy}; however, neither of these sets can occur in a run of the Diﬃe-Hellman
protocol between two honest principals, so they are not contained in the set Υ =
(DH).
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let Q be a protocol run, and A a set of actions in Q. The term
context is the set
Q(A) =
⋃
P∈Π
ΓιP ∪ Γ
A
P
where Π is the set of principals engaged in the run, ΓιP is the set of terms known
to a principal P initially, and ΓAP is the set of terms known to P before any of the
actions a ∈ A are executed in Q.
Using the guard relation, we can prove that the challenge-response protocol
validates authentication.
Theorem 3.4 Let Q be a run of the challenge-response protocol on Fig. 2. Suppose
that the functions cV P and rV P satisfy
n
{cV P x, sV P }
o
guards rV P x within Q(rV P x)
where sV P is a secret known only to Peggy (and possibly to Victor). Then Victor is
justiﬁed in drawing the following global conclusion from his local observations:
V : (νx)V 	 〈c
V Px〉V 	 (r
V Px)V
=⇒
(
(νx)V 	 〈c
V Px〉V 	 ((c
V Px))P 	 〈〈r
V Px〉〉−→
P
	 (rV Px)V
)
(cr)
where the relation a	b says that action a occurs before action b, and 〈〈m〉〉−→
P
denotes
the ﬁrst time P sends message m after creating it.
The proof of this theorem is obtained by expanding the deﬁnition of the guard
relation and analyzing the term context of the challenge-response protocol. Several
examples of reasoning with this relation can be found in [24].
Comment about perfect cryptography. The algebraic guard relation is based
on the assumption that a term can only be derived algebraically, using the given
operations and equations. A term t thus either lies in a subalgebra generated by a
set of terms Ξ, or not, and we have Ξ  t ∨ Ξ  t. This means that the attacks
on the implementation of the term t are abstracted away. In particular, we assume
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that it is impossible to cryptanalyze the bitstrings representing t, and to derive t
by accumulating partial information about it. In other words, we assume perfect
cryptography.
Moreover, we assume that the algebraic derivations Ξ  t only use the equations
speciﬁed in the given algebraic theory T = (O,E). This means that the message
algebra T is assumed to be a free T-algebra, or that it is computationally unfeasible
for the attacker to ﬁnd any additional equations that T satisﬁes, not speciﬁed in
the theory T, and to use them in his derivations. This is roughly the pseudo-free
algebra assumption [28].
Can we apply Thm. 3.4 to the Hancke-Kuhn protocol? The Hancke-Kuhn
protocol on Fig. 1 is obviously a timed version of the challenge response template
from Fig. 2, for which Thm. 3.4 provides a general security claim. If the guard
condition holds, then the Theorem yields the security of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol.
In the algebraic model, the attacker at a given state either knows a term, or
not. As explained in Sec. 2, the attacker on the Hancke-Kuhn protocol may always
obtain half of the bits of the secret shared by Victor and Peggy by challenging her.
Does this mean that the attacker gets to know the secret? If not, then the guard
condition is satisﬁed. To apply Thm. 3.4, we should thus set up the algebraic model
so that a term is known only when all of its bits are known.
Howeber, the same security proof would also hold for a modiﬁed version of the
Hancke-Kuhn protocol, e.g. where xh = h(0) if x = a and xh = h(1) otherwise,
for some ﬁxed a ∈ Z2. The attacker still cannot algebraically derive the term x h
without x, because this term still depends on x. The guard condition holds, and
thus the protocol is algebraically secure. In reality, though, the attacker who always
responds with h(1) will succeed with a probability greater than 1 − 2−, assuming
that the challenge x is drawn uniformly. The algebraic security of the Hancke-Kuhn
type of protocols is not very realistic.
4 Protocol models with guessing
In this section we propose a probabilistic reﬁnement of the guard relation, which
captures and quantiﬁes just the partial information leaks, like the one in the Hancke-
Kuhn protocol, without adding any unnecessary conceptual machinery.
4.1 Implementing and guessing messages
In order to reason about the feasibility of the algebraic operations on messages,
and about guessing, we consider the implementations of the messages t ∈ T in
an algebra Ω of strings, which carries the structure of a message T-algebra, and
moreover set of randomized functions.
For concreteness, we assume that Ω = Z∗2 is the set of bitstrings. However,
any graded free monoid would do, since the only operations that we use are the
concatenation and the length.
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4.1.1 Implementing messages
Let H be a partially ordered set. We call an inﬁnitely increasing chain h0 < h1 <
h2 < · · · in H a H-tower. We denote by H
ω the set of towers in H.
Any free monoid Ω is partially ordered by the preﬁx relation
a  b ⇐⇒ ∃c ∈ Ω. a :: c = b
where a :: c can be viewed as the concatenation of the strings a and c. We call Ω-
towers streams. They are just inﬁnite sequences of strings, strictly extending each
other: a stream is a sequence a = {a}∈N ⊆ Ω
N such that a  a+1 for all . A
stream a is called an -stream if the length of -th element is exactly |a| = . The
set of streams through Ω is denoted by Ωω.
N can be viewed as the special case, since a natural number can be viewed as a
string of 1s. The set Nω consists of strictly increasing sequences of natural numbers.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let X be a set of indeterminates. Its strength is a map |−| : X −→
N
ω, assigning to each indeterminate x for each value of the security parameter  ∈ N
the required length |x| ∈ N.
An environment is a partial map η : X ⇀ Ωω such that |η(x)| = |x| whenever
η(x) is deﬁned.
An implementation of a T-algebra T is an injective T-algebra homomorphism
− : T  Ωω.
An environment and an implementation induce a T-algebra homomorphism
−η : T [Xη] −→ Ω
ω, where Xη ⊆ X is the domain of deﬁnition of η. We call
this homomorphism an implementation too whenever it is injective.
The implementation of the algebra T assigns a unique string to each term. By
deﬁnition of the polynomial algebra T [Xη], every algebra homomorphism T −→ U to
another algebra U , and a function Xη −→ U induce a unique algebra homomorphism
T [Xη] −→ U .
Since any algebraic operation on Ω lifts to a pointwise operation over any power
Ωn, it also lifts to streams. So Ωω is also a T-algebra, and a monoid for (elementwise)
concatenation. 5
Notation. When confusion seems unlikely, we ignore the diﬀerence between the
indeterminates x, y . . . ∈ X and their environment values η(x), η(y) . . . ∈ Ω.
4.1.2 Randomized functions
Consider the set of partial functions
R = {f : Ω × Ω ⇀ Ω |∀x∀ρ1∀ρ2.f(ρ1, a) ↓ ∧ f(ρ2, a) ↓ ⇒ |ρ1| = |ρ2|
}
where f(ρ, a)↓ means that f is deﬁned on ρ, a, and |ρ| is the length of the bitstring
ρ. The set R is a monoid with the following composition operation
f ◦ g(ρ2 :: ρ1, a) = f(ρ2, g(ρ1, a))
5 Grading is not an algebraic operation, and it does not lift: the length of each stream is inﬁnite.
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and with the function ι (o, a) = a as the unit, where o denotes the empty string.
We interpret the elements of R as randomized functions over Ω: the ﬁrst argument
ρ represents the random seed, and the second argument a is the actual input. The
output fa can then be viewed as a random variable with the probability distribution
Prob(fa = b) =
#{ρ | f(ρ, a) = b}
2r
(5)
where r is the length of all ρ for which f(ρ, a) is deﬁned. Leaving the seed implicit,
we denote randomized functions, as presented in R, in the form f : Ω
R
−→ Ω.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A stream of functions is a sequence f = {f}∈N ∈ R
N which is
monotone, in the sense that for all streams a, ρ ∈ Ωω, at every  ∈ N holds
f(ρ, a) ↓ ∧ f+1(ρ+1, a+1) ↓ =⇒ f(ρ, a)  f+1(ρ+1, a+1)
We denote the monoid of streams of functions by Rω.
4.1.3 Indistinguishability
Surviving the ﬂood of negligible factors. Every subterm of every term in every
security protocol can in principle be guessed. Such probabilities are usually tolerably
small: they are negligible functions of some security parameter . In probabilistic
analyses, it is often convenient to ignore such events of negligible probability. In
a protocol analysis, tracking all terms and subterms that can be guessed with a
negligible probability can lead to a lengthy list, without revealing anything non-
negligible. In this section, we provide an underpinning for formal probabilistic
reasoning up to negligible factors.
The frequencies of events are established by repeated sampling. The number of
samples needed for a reasonable estimate depends on a priori chance that the event
will occur. If this chance is 1 in n, then the number of the needed sample is an
increasing function of n.
When sampling a stream a = {a}∈N, we assume that a reasonable amount
of samples should not be greater than q(), where q is a function from a rig 6
Q ⊆ NN. In cryptography it is customary to take Q = N[x], the polynomials with
non-negative integer coeﬃcients. Streams are thus sampled a polynomial number
of times. If the probability that the diﬀerence between a and b will be detected in
q() samples remains small for all , then a = {a}∈N and b = {b}∈N are considered
indistinguishable. In other words, a and b are indistinguishable if the probability
that a and b are diﬀerent is less than
1
q() for all q ∈ Q. Now we formalize this
intuition.
Deﬁnition 4.3 A function ν : N −→ [0, 1] is said to be Q-negligible if it converges
to 0 faster than 1
q() for all q ∈ Q, i.e.
∀q ∈ Q ∃n ∈ N ∀ ≥ n. ν()<
1
q()
6 A rig Q is a ”ring without the negatives”: it consists of two commutative monoid structures, (Q,+, 0)
and (Q, ·, 1), such that x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z and x · 0 = 0.
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The set of Q-negligible functions is denoted by 1
Q
. The ordering on streams a, b ∈
[0, 1]N is deﬁned up to negligible functions, i.e.
a ≤ b ⇐⇒ ∃ν∀. a + ν() ≤ b
We say that a, b ∈ [0, 1]N are Q-indistinguishable, and write a
Q
∼ b, if a ≤ b and
b ≤ a, or equivalently
a ∼ b ⇐⇒ ∃ν∀. |a − b| ≤ ν()
Assumption, examples. For simplicity, we take Q to be the rig N[x] of polyno-
mials with non-negative integer coeﬃcients, as it is usually taken in cryptography.
Then, e.g., for a = {2}∈N and b = {
−2}∈N holds a ∼ 0, but b ∼ 0, where 0 is
viewed as the constrant sequence.
Deﬁnition 4.4 Streams of functions f and g are indistinguishable if the sequences
Prob(fa = b) and Prob(ga = b) are indistinguishable for all streams a, b ∈ Ωω. We
abbreviate
f ∼ g ⇐⇒ ∀ab ∈ Ωω. Prob(fa = b) ∼ Prob(ga = b)
Deﬁnition 4.5 A ﬂow is an equivalence class of streams of randomized functions.
The ﬂow monoid R˜ is thus
R˜=Rω/ ∼
4.2 Probabilistic derivability
In contrast with the algebraic derivability relation from Sec. 3.3, the probabilistic
derivability relation does capture partial information leaks, using the implementa-
tions of the terms. While Ξ  Θ may happen because some t ∈ Θ is not algebraically
derivable from Ξ, it may be easy to guess many bits of information about Θ from Ξ.
We formalize this by saying that for some stream of randomized functions f ∈ R,
Prob(fΞ = Θ) is high. By assumption, the messages Θ are easily decoded from
their implementations Θ. So if some f is likely to output Θ on the input Ξ,
then the chance to derive Θ from Ξ is high. This is what we want to capture by the
following randomized derivability relation, which quantiﬁes guessing chance.
Let X (Ξ) ⊆ X be the set of indeterminates that occur in Ξ. Any minimal
environment η in which the Ξη is deﬁned must be deﬁned over X (Ξ). Since for
each  the required number of bits for each x ∈ X (Ξ) is ﬁxed to |x|, each η must
select the same number of bits
|X (Ξ)| =
∑
x∈X (Ξ)
|x|
So there are 2|X (Ξ)| environments to interpret Ξ for the security parameter . Our
chance to guess Θ from Ξ is the probability that a ﬂow f ∈ R˜ will output Θη when
given the input Ξη, for the random choices of η. Hence the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.6 The guessing chance
[
Ξ  Θ
]
is the stream of probabilities
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[
Ξ  Θ
]

=
∨
f∈R
#{η | fΞ = Θ}
2|X (Ξ,Θ)|
(6)
viewed up to indistinguishability.
We abbreviate
[
∅  Θ
]
to
[
Θ
]
.
Since the functions in the sequence {f}∈N compute on streams Ξ, together
they form a stream of functions f ∈ Rω, i.e. a ﬂow fΞ = Θ.
Examples. For any closed term t ∈ T , i.e. such that X (t) = ∅, it holds that[
t
]
= 1. To see this, note that t is given in the empty environment η∅, and thus
X (t) = ∅ implies |X (t)| = 0 for all . The supremum of (6) is reached at the
constant function stream f() = t, and gives
[
t
]
= #{η∅ | f()=t}
20
= 1.
On the other hand, for every x ∈ X holds
[
x
]

= 0. There are exactly 2|x|
environments ηx, deﬁned on x alone. To guess x without any inputs, we need a
constant ﬂow f , such that f() = x = ηx(x), i.e. a constant stream of functions
f() = ηx(x). Whichever f we may choose, exactly one environment ηx will give
f() = ηx(x). So for every constant ﬂow f holds
#{ηx | f()=x}
2|x|
= 1
2|x|
. The
supremum in (6) is thus reached for all constant f ∈ R˜, and
[
x
]

= 1
2|x|
. But the
sequence
{
2−|x|
}
∈N
is indistinguishable from 0, as pointed out after Def. 4.3.
4.2.1 Subbayesian reasoning and Advantage
Proposition 4.7 For all sets of terms Ξ,Γ,Θ holds[
Ξ  Γ
]
·
[
Ξ,Γ  Θ
]
≤
[
Ξ  Γ,Θ
]
(7)
When
[
Γ
]
> 0, it follows that[
Γ  Θ
]
≤
[
Γ,Θ
][
Γ
] (8)
The inequalities become equalities if Ξ and Θ have no indeterminates in common.
Deﬁnition 4.8 The advantage provided by a set of terms Ξ in computing the terms
Θ is the value
Adv
[
Ξ  Θ
]
=
[
Ξ  Θ
]
−
[
Θ
]
When this advantage is zero, we say that Θ is ﬂow independent of Ξ, and write[
Ξ⊥Θ
]
⇐⇒ Adv
[
Ξ  Θ
]
= 0 ⇐⇒
[
Ξ  Θ
]
=
[
Θ
]
4.3 Probabilistic guards
The idea of the guard relation is that a term t is guarded by one of the guards from
G if whenever t is derived, then at least one of the guards Γ ∈ G is also derived.
In the algebraic model, this was simple enough to state by Deﬁnition 3.2. When t
can be guessed, then this crude statement needs to be reﬁned: the event that t is
guessed must be preceded by the event that some Γ ∈ G is guessed.
Deﬁnition 4.9 We say that a set of sets of terms G guards (against guessing) a
term t with respect to a set of terms Υ, and write G guards t within Υ if for all Ξ ⊆ Υ
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such that Adv
[
Ξ  t
]
> 0 holds[
Ξ  t
]
≤
∨
Γ∈G
[
Ξ  Γ
]
·
[
Ξ,Γ  t
]
(9)
Explanation. In the algebraic case, (4) was an attempt to capture the intuition
that G guards t if all computational paths to t lead through some Γ ∈ G, assuming
the context C. The above deﬁnition extends this attempt to computational paths
with guessing. If we get any help from Ξ to guess t, then that help is not greater
than the help we get from it to guess some guard Γ ∈ G of t ﬁrst, and then to guess
t from this guard. Applied to message theories with trivial implementations (e.g.
with Ω = 1), Def. 4.9 boils down to Def. 3.2, in the sense that the guessing chance
is always constantly 0 or constantly 1, and (9) reduces to (4).
To simplify notation, we elide the environment subscripts from −η whenever
η is inessential for the argument.
5 Partitioned functions and 
In this section we analyze a class of quickly computable functions, like the one
used in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. One way to ensure that a function is quickly
computable is to require that the bit dependency of its outputs from its inputs must
be partitioned: the i-th block of output bits should only depend on the i-th block
of input bits. Since in this section we are dealing with purely random input, our
results are presented in terms of streams, not ﬂows.
Deﬁnition 5.1 We say that a boolean function f : Zm2 −→ Z
n
2 is partitioned when
m=m1 +m2 + · · ·+m
n= n1 + n2 + · · ·+ n
f = f1 :: f2 :: · · · :: f
where fi : Z
mi
2 −→ Z
ni
2 , for i = 1, 2, . . .  are independent on the inputs and the
outputs of all other component functions, in the sense that
[
xı, fı(xı)⊥ fi(xi)
]
, where
ı = {j ≤ | j = i}.
Clearly, a boolean function receiving its input string sequentially can already
return the i-th block of its outputs while still receiving i + 1st block of the inputs.
Unfortunately, this convenient property also decreases cryptographic strength of
the function, which requires that each bit of the output depends on each bit of the
input [33]. In particular, knowing a value f(z) of a partitioned function increases
the chance of guessing f(x). We make this precise in the next section.
5.1 Guessing partitioned functions
Proposition 5.2 (a) Let f be a randomized partitioned function, and let x, z ∈ Zm2
be ﬁxed bitstrings with a common block xi = zi ∈ Z
n
2 . Then
[
x, z, f(z)  f(x)
]
≥
2n−m.
(b) Let f : Z2 −→ Z

2 be randomized bitwise partitioned, i.e. |mi| = |ni| = 1 for
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all i ≤ . Then
[
x, z, f(z)  f(x)
]
≥ 2−Δ(x,z), where Δ(x, z) = #{i|x = z} is the
Hamming distance.
A consequence of Prop. 5.2 is that a proximity authentication protocol, im-
plemented using a partitioned function R to compute the response rV Px =
R(sV P , cV Px), cannot be secure in an absolute sense, because the response may
be guessed with a non-negligible probability from the other responses rV P z. More-
over, it seems that the attacker can always obtain some other responses rV P z by
impersonating Victor and issuing challenges cV P z.
Lemma 5.3 A randomized boolean function f : Z2 −→ Z

2 is bitwise partitioned if
and only if for every x ∈ Z2 it holds that
f(x) = x
(
f(0) :: f(1)
)
(10)
where  is the Hancke-Kuhn function (1), and 0, 1 ∈ Z2 are the strings of 0s and
1s, respectively.
Bitwise partitioned functions with a minimal guessing probability can now be
completely characterized: they turn out to be precisely the Hancke-Kuhn functions
(1) for which the values at 0 and at 1 are independent.
Proposition 5.4 Suppose that f : Z2 −→ Z

2 is a randomized bitwise partitioned
function such that
[
x⊥ f(0) :: f(1)
]
. Then for ﬁxed z and x ∈ Z:[
x, z, f(z)  f(x)
]
=2−Δ(z,x) (11)
if and only if for every i ≤  it holds that[
fi(0)⊥ fi(1)
]
and
[
fi(1)⊥ fi(0)
]
(12)
Remark. In a sense, x  (−) : Z22 −→ Z

2 is thus a ”one-and-half-way function”,
since x h discloses only one half of the bits of h.
On the other hand, (−)  h : Z2 −→ Z

2 is not only an example of a bitwise
partitioned function, satisfying the needs of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol, but it is a
canonical way to represent such functions.
5.2 Guessing x h
We now consider the probability of guessing xh given various sorts of information
that may be learned in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol.
Deﬁnition 5.5 a) For x ∈ Z2 and I ⊆  = {0, 1, 2, . . . − 1} we deﬁne x
I ∈ Z2 to
be the bit string obtained by replacing for all i ∈ I the bits xi with a “wild card” 
xIj =
{
 if j ∈ I
xj otherwise
b) For h = h(0) :: h(1), where h(0), h(1) ∈ Z2 we deﬁne the kernel κh to be the set of
places where its ﬁrst and its second half coincide, e.g.
κh= {i ∈  | h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i }.
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We make use of these deﬁnitions in the following.
Proposition 5.6 Suppose that h the concatenation of two constant -bit streams,
and x is a uniformly distributed -bit stream. Then
(a)
[
h  x h
]

= 2|κh|−
(b)
[
x, h  x h
]

=
[
xκh, h  x h
]
The following lemma concerns the problem of deriving xh from zh for some
z.
Proposition 5.7 Let h be the concatenation of two uniformly distributed -bit
streams, let x be a uniformly distributed -bit stream, and let z be any -bit stream.
Then the following holds.[
z  h  x h
]

=
[
z, z  h  x h
]

=
(
3
4
)
6 Security of Hancke-Kuhn
We quantify the security of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol by evaluating Prob(crp), i.e.
the probability that the sequence of events in a complete protocol run validates the
following reasoning of Victor’s
V : (νx)V 	 τ〈x〉V 	 τ(x h)V
=⇒
(
(νx)V 	 τ〈x〉V 	 (x)P 	 〈x h〉−→P 	 τ(x h)V
)
(crp)
corresponding to the run on Fig. 1. In order to evaluate this probability, we an-
alyze the probability that (crp) fails. How can it happen that Victor observes a
satisfactory sequence of his own actions
V = (νx)V 	 τ〈x〉V 	 τ (x h)V (13)
but that the desired run
O = τ〈x〉V 	 (x)P 	 〈x h〉−→P 	 τ (x h)V (14)
did not take place? There are just two possibilities:
A: the responder does not know the secret s, i.e. he is the Attacker,
E: the responder knows the secret s, i.e. he is Peggy, but the response is sent Early,
without receiving the challenge.
The remaining case, that the responder is Peggy, and she responds to the challenge,
is just the event O. Thus ¬O = A∪ E . It follows that
Prob(crp) = Prob(O|V) = 1− Prob(A ∪ E|V)
≥ 1− Prob(A|V)− Prob(E|V) (15)
The (in)security of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol thus boils down to evaluating
Prob(A|V) and Prob(E|V). The following lemmas and propositions show that these
probabilities are negligible. The proofs are in the Appendix.
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Response token. Recall that Peggy’s response token h = H(s :: a :: b) is derived
from the shared secret s, Peggy’s counter a, and Victor’s counter b, using a secure
public hash function H. In this section, h abbreviates H(s :: a :: b).
Assumption 6.1 The above decomposition of ¬O as A ∪ E is valid only if h =
H(s :: a :: b) is such that
• |s|  |x|, i.e. attacker’s chance to guess the secret s is negligible compared with
his chance to guess the challenge x;
• the counters a and b are never reused (although they may be predictable).
Otherwise, the attacker may guess h, and ¬O may not be covered by A ∪ E .
6.1 Guards in undesired runs
In order to evaluate Prob(crp), we need to determine the probability that the correct
response x  h is guessed in the undesired runs A and E . Towards this goal, we
explore what can be guessed in the term contexts (cf. Def. 3.3) A(x h) and E(x).
The following lemmas simplify this question.
Lemma 6.2 (a) Let A be an attack run with a long term secret s, Peggy’s counter
a, Victor’s counter b, and Attacker’s challenge z, for which he obtains the response
z  h, where h = H(s :: a :: b). Then for any Ξ ⊆ A(x h) it holds that[
Ξ  x h
]
=
[
Ξ ∩ {s, a, b, x, z, z  h}  x h
]
(b) Let E be a run with a long term secret s, Peggy’s counter a, Victor’s counter
b, and where Peggy responds early. Then for any Ξ ⊆ E(x) it holds that[
Ξ  x h
]
=
[
Ξ ∩ {s, a, b}  x h
]
Lemma 6.3 For h = H(s :: a :: b) and Υ ⊆ {z, z  h} it holds that
[
x h
]

=
[
x, z  x h
]

= 2− (16)[
a, b, s, xκh  x h
]
= 1 (17)[
a, b, s, x,Υ  x h
]
= 1 (18)
Proposition 6.4 {{s}, {z  h}} guards x h within A(x h)
Proposition 6.5
{
{xκh}
}
guards x h within E(x)
The guards displayed in the preceding Propositions will now be used to evaluate
Prob(V|A) and Prob(V|E), i.e. the probabilities that the authentication may fail
because the Attacker breaks it, or because Peggy’s succeeds in responding Early.
6.2 Bounds on undesired runs
Proposition 6.4 and the deﬁnition of probabilistic guards say that, for a given chal-
lenge x, the probability that an Attacker can violate authentication is bounded
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above by [
Φ  s
]
·
[
Φ, s  x h
]
or by[
Φ  z  h
]
·
[
Φ, z  h  x h
]
where Φ = {a, b, z, z  h}. The ﬁrst quantity is clearly negligible. We must show
the same for the second.
Likewise, Proposition 6.5 implies that the probability that Peggy can respond
Early is bounded above by[
s, a, b  xκh
]
·
[
s, a, b, xκh  x h
]
Note that in the attack run A, the Attacker cannot learn x until after she has
created z. The distribution of z is thus independent from that of x.
Proposition 6.6 Suppose that the Attacker, before receiving Victor’s challenge x,
can pick her own challenge z and obtain a single response z  h. Then the stream
of expected probabilities Prob(V|A) that the Attacker can deceive Victor by guessing
x h is indistinguishable from the stream of probabilities p deﬁned by
p =
∑
x∈Z
2
2−
[
x, z, z  h  x h
]

=
(
3
4
)
This means that Prob(V|A) is negligible.
Proposition 6.7 The stream of expected probabilities Prob(V|E) that Peggy can
deceive Victor by guessing and sending her response before she receives the challenge
is indistinguishable from the stream q deﬁned by
q =
∑
h∈Z
2
∑
x∈Z
2
2−
[
h  x h
]

=
(
3
4
)
This means that Prob(V|E) is negligible.
Note in particular that this means that in both cases the stream of probabilities
is indistinguishable from zero, since the stream
(
3
4
)
is itself indistinguishable from
zero.
The ﬁnal result is obtained by putting Propositions 6.4 and 6.6 together.
Theorem 6.8 Suppose that the Hancke-Kuhn protocol is realized in such a way
that it satisfyes 6.1, and does not always fail for trivial reasons: i.e., there are some
sessions with an honest prover Peggy and an honest veriﬁer Victor. Formally, this
means that there are C,D ∈ (0, 1) such that
• Prob(A),Prob(E) < C, i.e. not every response is from an Attacker, or too Early,
• Prob(V) > D, i.e. Victor sometimes observes a satisfactory run and accepts.
Then Prob(crp) is indistinguishable from 1. In other words, the Hancke-Kuhn pro-
tocol achieves authentication almost certainly.
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7 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for extending algebraic cryptographic models to
probabilistic models and used it to construct a probabilistic extension of the Pro-
tocol Derivation Logic. We have illustrated it by applying it to an analysis of the
Hancke-Kuhn distance bounding protocol. We expect that it will be useful in the
analysis of many other protocols that rely on weak cryptography to take advantage
of non-standard communication channels.
We should also point out that the potential applications of our framework go
far beyond purely probabilistic extensions. The main thing that needs to be done
to make our framework applicable to computational models is to deﬁne a notion of
feasibly computable functions, so that guessing probability can be deﬁned in terms
of feasible function streams instead of all possible function streams. We have deﬁned
such a notion and are currently investigating its applications to protocols. In future
work, we expect to present a more general framework that can incorporate a wide
range of methods of cryptographic reasoning.
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A Appendix: The Proofs
Proof of Prop. 4.7. Let f and g be randomized functions. Consider the sets F =
{χ | fΞχ = Γχ} and G = {η | gΞ,Γη = Θη}.
Claim 1. If for x, y ∈ X (Ξ,Γ) and η such that gΞ,Γη = Θη holds η(x) =
η(y), then for η̂, which is equal to η everywhere except on η̂(x) = η̂(y), holds
that ĝΞ,Γbη = Θbη, for ĝ modiﬁed accordingly. (Intuitively, separating two
pieces of input can only provide more information, not less.)
Claim 2. If fΞχ = Γχ} and dom(χ) ⊆ dom(η), with χ(x) = χ(y) ⇒
η(x) = η(y), then f can be precomposed with a permutation to yield f̂ with
dom(f̂) ⊆ dom(η) and f̂Ξη = Γη}.
The consequence of these claims is that we can modify f and g to f̂ and ĝ so
that #F = #F̂ and # = Ĝ.
Now let h(x) = f(x) :: g(x :: y). Since thus hΞη = (fΞη) ::
(g (Ξη :: fΞη)) = Γ,Θη holds, we have
#{η | fΞ = Γ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|
·
#{η | gΞ,Γ = Θ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|
≤
#{η | hΞ = Γ,Θ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|
The inequality
[
Ξ  Γ
]
·
[
Ξ,Γ  Θ
]
≤
[
Ξ  Γ,Θ
]
follows by observing that
#{η | fΞ = Γ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|
=
#{χ | fΞ = Γ}
2|Ξ,Γ,|

Proof of Prop. 5.2. For (a), xi = zi yields fi(xi) = fi(zi), so we only need to guess
at most n− ni bits. For (b), xi and zi are bits, and n−Δ(x, z) of them are equal,
so we only need to guess at most Δ(x, z) bits. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. (f(x))i = fi(xi) =
(
x
(
f(0) :: f(1)
))
i
holds by the
deﬁnition of bitwise partitioned functions at the ﬁrst step, and by (1) at the second
step. 
Proof of Prop. 5.4. Assumptions (12) say that the inequality xi = zi implies[
xi, zi, fi(zi)  fi(xi)
]
=
[
xi  fi(xi)
]
. On the other hand, by deﬁnition, the
components of a partitioned function are mutually independent.Hence
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[
x, z, f(z)  f(x)
]
=
∏
i=1
[
x, z, f(z)  fi(xi)
]
=
∏
i=1
xi =zi
[
xi  fi(xi)
]
=
∏
Δ(z,x)
1
2
= 2−Δ(z,x)
The other way around, using (11) at the second step, we get
∏
i=1
[
x, z, f(z)  fi(xi)
]
=
[
x, z, f(z)  f(x)
]
= 2−Δ(z,x)
=
∏
i=1
xi =zi
[
xi  fi(xi)
]
which, with the componentwise independence, yields (12). 
Proof of Prop. 5.6. Note that for each i ∈ κh, the bit (x  h)i = h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i does
not depend on xi. This means that x h only depends on x
κh. 
Proof of Prop. 5.7. Guessing x h from z and z  h can be modeled as a version
of the Monty Hall problem [31], where Monty randomly selects x and h and the
contestant chooses z. Monty then announces zh and the contestant guesses xh.
Since the bits of x are independent, it is enough to consider the case  = 1.
Monty then ﬂips three fair coins to pick the secret bits x, h(0), and h(1), while the
contestant picks a bit z. Monty then announces zh = h(z). Should the contestant
now guess that x h = z  h, or should he switch to x h = ¬(z  h)?
Denote by q the probability that the contestant picks xh = zh. If h(0) = h(1),
the contestant wins with this choice, because the value x h is the same for every
x. Since h(0) and h(1) were randomly chosen, Prob(h(0) = h(1)) = 12 . Otherwise,
if h(0) = h(1), then x  h = z  h holds if and only if x = z. Since x is random,
Prob(x = z) = 12 , and hence Prob(h
(0) = h(1) ∧ x = z) = 14 , because h
(0), h(1) and
x are independent.
The probability that the contestant will make a correct guess is thus
q ·
(
Prob
(
h(0) = h(1)
)
+ Prob
(
h(0) = h(1) ∧ x = z
))
=
3q
4
To maximize this probability, the contestant needs q = 1, and should thus stickwith
Monty’s bit z  h.
The proof for
[
zh  xh
]
diﬀers just in the detail that z is not chosen by the
contestant, but obeys some unknown distribution. However, x is still independent
of z. Thus for some p, Prob(x = z) = Prob(x = 0) · Prob(z = 0) + Prob(x =
1) · Prob(z = 1) = 12p+
1
2(1− p) =
1
2 . 
Proof of Lemma 6.2(a). By assumption, the outputs of the hash function H are
indistinguishable from random strings, and thus satisfy
[
H(u)⊥H(v)
]
for all u = v.
Recall that A(x h) is the union of the contexts observed by the possible par-
ticipants in the run A, before xh is known. Besides s, known by Victor and Peggy,
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and a, b and x, announced publicly but never reused, the context A(x h) thus
also contains a single additional challenge z, issued by the Attacker, and the corre-
sponding response z  h (provided by Peggy before she receives Victor’s challenge
x).
Moreover, the Attacker may issue a family Y ⊆ Z2 of additional challenges to
Peggy, and construct a list {by}y∈Y of the future values of Victor’s counter. To
each new challenge, Peggy will respond with y  hy, where each response token
hy = H(s :: ay :: by) is derived using a new value of the counter ay. By assumption,[
hy ⊥h
]
holds for all y. Independently of the distance of Y and the challenge x, the
responses y  hy will provide no information about x  h. In summary, the term
context A(x h) is thus
{s, a, b, x, z, z  h} ∪ {y, ay , by, y  hy | hy = H(s.ay.by) ∧ y ∈ Y }
for some Y ⊆ Z2, where a : Y → Z

2 is injective, and b : Y → Z
n
2 arbitrary. The
assumption about H implies
[
y, ay, by, y hy ⊥ x h
]
, which further tells that for
any Ξ ⊆ A (x h)
{s, a, b, z, z  h} ∩ Ξ = ∅=⇒
[
Ξ ⊥ x h
]
and we are done.
The proof of 6.2(b) is analogous, but slightly simpler, elaborating the fact that
obtaining one challenge tells nothing about another one. 
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Since h is indistinguishable from random, the bits of any
h are indistinguishable from independent. The probability of guessing any chosen
substring of length  in h is indistinguishable from 2−. In particular, the probability
of guessing x  h for a chosen x is indistinguishable from 2
−. Knowing which
substring is being guessed presents no advantage, and thus
[
x  x  h
]
= 2−.
Equations (17) and (18) follow from Prop. 5.6. 
Proof of Prop. 6.4. The claim follows from the fact that each set Ξ ⊆ A(x h)
such that Adv
[
Ξ  x h
]
> 0 satisﬁes at least one of the following inequalities:[
Ξ  x h
]
≤
[
Ξ  s
]
·
[
Ξ, s  x h
]
(A.1)[
Ξ  x h
]
≤
[
Ξ  z  h
]
·
[
Ξ, z  h  x h
]
(A.2)
According to Lemma 6.2(a) for each subset Ξ of A(xh) such that a ∈ Ξ, it suﬃces
to consider the set Ξ ∩ {s, a, b, x, z, z  h}. Once the problem is reduced this far,
the rest follows by case analysis, using Lemma 6.3. 
Proof of Prop. 6.5. The claim is that each Ξ ⊆ E(x) such that Adv
[
Ξ  xh
]
> 0
satisﬁes [
Ξ  x h
]
≤
[
Ξ  xκh
]
·
[
Ξ, xκh  x h
]
(A.3)
Lemma 6.2(b) says that it suﬃces to consider Ξ ∩ {s, a, b} if a ∈ Ξ. Thus, we only
need to consider the subsets of {s, a, b}, and since b is deterministic, this reduces to
the subsets of {s, a}. The assumption that the stream h is indistinguishable from
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random implies
[
Ξ  xh
]

= 2− whenever Ξ is a proper subset of {s, a}. So (A.3)
holds trivially in that case. For Ξ = {s, a}, using Prop. 5.6 and Lemma 6.3, we have[
Ξ  xh
]

=
[
Ξ  xκh
]

= 2|κh|− and on the other hand
[
Ξ, xκh  xh
]

= 1.
Hence (A.3). 
Proof of Prop. 6.6. Since Prob(x ∈ Z2) = 2
− by assumption, and
[
x, z, zh  x
h
]
= 2−Δ(z,x) by (11), it follows that
∑
x∈Z
2
2−
[
x, z, z  h  x  h
]

= 2− ·
∑
i=0
(

i
)
2−i = 2− ·
3
2
=
(
3
4
)

Proof of Prop. 6.7. By hypothesis the token h = H(s :: a :: b) is indistinguishable
from a random value. Since
[
s, a, b⊥x
]
also holds by assumption,
[
s, a, b  xh
]
=[
h  x  h
]
follows, because s, a, b can only be useful to derive h = H(s :: a :: b).
But Prop. 5.6(a) then implies that
[
s, a, b  x  h
]

= 2i−, where i = |κh|. The
expected value that Peggy will guess x h are averaged over the possible values of
h, and hence
∑
h∈Z
2
∑
x∈Z
2
2−
[
h  x h
]

= 2− ·
∑
i
(

i
)
2i− = 2−2 · 3 =
(
3
4
)

Proof of Thm. 6.8. By (15), to prove the Theorem, it suﬃces to show that both
Prob(A|V) and Prob(E|V) are negligible. The Bayes’ Theorem and the hypotheses
imply
Prob(A|V) =
Prob(V | A) · Prob(A)
Prob(V)
≤
Prob(V | A) · C
D
Since Prob(V|A) is negligible by Prop. 6.6, Prob(A|V) is negligible too. The fact
that Prob(E|V) is negligible follows in the same way from Prop. 6.7. 
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